

## INFORMATION REPORT

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Czechoslovakia from Communism and the UCSR

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1. The Communist Party presents to the public matters which usually do not contradict the truth or the intentions of the party but whose real purpose is intentionally concealed by tactical declarations or acts even from the loyal Communist official. The latter is merely a pawn in a game which he does not understand. A policy directed from the core of the party is carefully controlled so that performers of tasks will not know more than is absolutely necessary nor realize the true purpose of their activities. This is a clever measure as otherwise these people would realize prematurely that they are carrying out acts which are against their will or which will make them the victims. They are actors who are not allowed to understand the whole play, and severe measures are taken to ensure that one actor will not read the other's script. There are very few who remain until the end of the scene, and the entire play is known perhaps only to the directors or even perhaps only to the author. The best way of judging their aims is by observing who is assigned to the various parts and who is the assistant director, and then by ferreting out the truth from the masquerade of lies and contradictions. This is a road of many but well-planned curves, for which one cannot find any rules or, from the short-term view, any law. If the West is seeking an example from history, it errs. This situation is entirely new and the past cannot be used. This it happens that the methods of the West sometimes achieve the opposite of what was intended, to the advantage of the East.
2. The political methods of the East, however, have their weaknesses. It appears that although the Kremlin is aware of this fact, no defense has been devised by it, and thus the West could make use of these vulnerabilities.
3. Soviet imperialism, which is based on an effective and easily understood ideology, is aware that it is far from realizing such ideology. It builds everything on material strength but for the good of the state rather than that of the people. The Kremlin is constantly postponing attainment of that part of the program which would materially help the standard of living of the Soviet citizen until it (the Kremlin) has conquered western capitalism and taken charge of the world. Thus the Kremlin is building on a long-term provisionism (sic, possibly program). The ignorance, misinformation and lack of freedom of the Soviet people and of the satellites aid the Kremlin, which believes that if it continues its present practices, it will not encounter any dangerous competition.

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4. The task of the opponents of the USSR is to disparage the Marx-Lenin philosophy before the entire world by utilizing the period when the USSR is busy with its imperialistic aims and not able to make its people happy. It is time that the Communists were prevented from passing on their ideology to the democratic sectors of the world and that steps be taken to destroy Communistic "monopoly" in its present spheres, not only outside the USSR and its satellites, but even in the "internal Soviet market", and to repudiate it as being deceitful. This is the most vulnerable aspect of Kremlin policy, and the time is ripe for initiating an attack. It is a question of a new revolution which would lead to real democracy of the type known as Masaryk's democracy. Of course, this assumes a Masaryk whose democratic concept is fully understood and is recognized to be a force bringing together societies and morally mobilizing the world in the broadest sense.

5. It is believed that an opportunity to initiate this action will present itself during disagreement, which possibly will occur soon, between the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, during which time both suppressed nations will rid themselves of the Soviet influence at all costs. This disagreement will emerge from the Soviet aim to win over the Germans at the expense of the satellites. In this connection it is recommended that the Czechs, as a political necessity and on their own initiative, begin to solve the problem of the return of the Sudeten Germans. To live in Czechoslovakia later on with Germans who returned to the border areas against the will of the Czechs—for example upon instructions of the USSR or of the West—would be more difficult than if the Czechs presented their own solution, thus furnishing proof of their good will to overcome all obstacles to a lasting peace and a future united Europe. It is believed that as a last resort, Czechoslovakia would accept a solution if it came from the West. The Poles would probably react in the same manner because it would also be more acceptable and safer for them to accept a correction of the Polish-German border based on their own proposal than on the dictate of the Russians.

6. Of course it is important that the Czechs make known their offer in time. A late proposal could be judged as an escape from difficulties and encourage the Germans to step up their demands. If the Czechs began to solve the Sudeten-German problem, they would help the West win the support of the Germans sooner than would the USSR in the same way, and the Germans would always remember who had made this gesture.

7. After the unification of Germany by the West, the USSR would find itself on the defensive and would face a solid and genuine force which is eager for a just settlement of the world and against which the Marx-Lenin theory would be helpless. And in Czechoslovakia the Masaryk democracy would certainly find a way which would enable not only different classes to live together peacefully, but also different nationalities.

8. It is believed that the USSR can be defeated without a war only by the fulfillment of a program nobler than that presented by the Marx-Lenin theory. This means a decisive and comprehensive realization of Masaryk's principles of humanitarian democracy.

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